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S. 307: OHIO'S NEW WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW-AT
LEAST FOR NOW
I.

INTRODUCTION

On May 23, 1986, Ohio Governor Richard Celeste signed into law
Amended Substitute Senate Bill 307, which substantially revises Ohio's
workers' compensation law.' One of the most significant changes in the
law is the addition of section 4121.80 of the Ohio Revised Code which
provides for, defines, and limits an employee's right to pursue a cause
of action based in intentional tort against his employer.' This section
was a reaction to a recent string of Ohio Supreme Court decisions liberalizing the right of injured workers to sue at common law for injuries
that allegedly resulted from the intentionally tortious conduct of their
employers.3 The changes brought about by the addition of section
4121.80 will undoubtedly prompt constitutional challenges to the bill.'
The bill eliminates the right to trial by jury in actions based in
intentional tort. The bill also changes the definition of what constitutes
an intentional tort, and the bill limits the amount of damages recoverable in an action based in intentional tort. Finally, the bill provides for
the retroactive application of all of these provisions.
. This note provides a history of the workers' compensation law in
Ohio, a survey of the cases leading to the passage of S. 307, and an
analysis of the constitutionality of several of the provisions of S. 307
that are likely to prompt litigation in Ohio courts.

1. Act of May 15, 1986, 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-350 (Baldwin) (codified in scattered
sections of tits. I and 4) OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (Anderson Supp. 1986).
2. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80 (Anderson Supp. 1986).
3. According to the sponsor of S. 307, Senator Richard Finan, the main purpose of the bill
was "the reversal of the Blankenship problem for intentional tort and putting that back under the
workers' compensation system, per se, instead of the court of common pleas." J. HARRIS, OHIO
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT 31 (1986). Mr. Harris is an attorney specializing in workers'
compensation, social security, and personal injury law. He was the plaintiffs attorney in Blankenship discussed infra notes 22-35 and accompanying test. Mr. Harris is also the editor of the
Workers' Compensation Journalof Ohio. See J. HARRIS, supra, at About the Author. His book
was the first extensive analysis of the Bill's provisions and impact. Id. at Preface.
4. Id. at 39. This note deals only with those provisions of S. 307 that seem to have generated the most concern within the legal community and the media and that are likely to receive the
most initial attention in the courts. Other provisions which are likely to be challenged on constitutional grounds include, but are not limited to, section 4121.80(F) of the Ohio Revised Code, limiting attorney's fees, section 4121.80(A), changing the statute of limitations, and section
4121.80(D) providing for a setoff of damages awarded in an action in intentional tort in an
amount equal to the benefits that an employer has received in workers' compensation benefits.
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II. BACKGROUND

A.

The Early Workers' Compensation Law in Ohio

Ohio's first workers' compensation law was enacted in 1911.' The
policy underlying the enactment of that law was articulated by the
Ohio Supreme Court in State ex rel. Munding v. Industrial
Commission:6
[T]he theory upon which the compensation law is based. . is that each
time an employee is killed or injured there is an economic loss which
must be made up or compensated in some way, that most accidents are
attributable to the inherent risk of employment-that is, no one is directly at fault-that the burden of this economic loss should be borne by
the industry rather than society as a whole, that a fund should be provided by the industry from which a fixed sum should be set apart as
the person injured, or his depenevery accident occurs to compensate
7
dents, for his or their loss.
The 1911 Act was, for the most part, an exclusive remedy. An
employee could still, however, maintain an action at common law when
his injury resulted from the willful act of his employer or the employer's agent, or when the employer had failed to comply with a particular safety law. 8 In 1924, the Ohio Constitution was amended to
provide guidelines for the workers' compensation system. 9
Article II, section 35 appears to make workers' compensation benefits an exclusive remedy. The amendment states that "[sluch compensation shall be in lieu of all other rights to compensation, or damages,
for such death, injuries, or occupational disease, and any employer who
pays the premium or compensation provided by law . . . shall not be

liable to respond in damages at common law." 10 Ohio courts strictly
upheld the exclusive remedy provision" of the amendment until 1939.

5. 1911 Ohio Laws 524.
6. 92 Ohio St. 434, Il1 N.E. 299 (1915).
7. Id. at 450-51, 111 N.E. at 303.
8. OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 1465-76 (Anderson 1916) (repealed 1931). "Any employer
. . . who shall pay into the state insurance fund the premiums provided by this act shall not be
" Id.
liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute, save as hereinafter provided ....
§ 1465-57 (Anderson 1912) (repealed 1913). "But where a personal injury is suffered by an employe . . . and . . . such injury has arisen from the wilfull act of such employer . . . or from the
failure of such employer . . . to comply with . . . any statute . . . such injured employe. . . may,
" Id. § 1465-61.
at his option, . . . institute proceedings in the courts for his damage ..
9. OHIo CONsT. art. II, § 35 (did not originally include language granting a common-law
cause of action to an employee who had been injured by the willful act of his employer or through
his employer's failure to comply with a safety statute).
10. Id.
11. See Zajachuk v. Willard Storage Battery Co., 106 Ohio St. 538, 542, 140 N.E. 405,
407 (1922) (holding that occupational diseases were not compensable under the workers' compenhttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/15
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In Triff v. National Bronze & Aluminum Foundry Co., 2 the Ohio Supreme Court held that an employee had the right to maintain an action
at common law for injuries which were not compensable under the
workers' compensation system."3 The court held that the intent of Article II, section 35, was to grant employer- immunity only for those injuries which were compensable under the Act. 4 The Act was again
amended in 1959 in an effort to restore employer immunity for injuries
that were not compensable under the Act, but made occupational diseases compensable under the Act.' 5
B.

Blankenship and Its Progeny

For a time, Ohio courts once again held the workers' compensation
system to be an employee's exclusive remedy.' 6 Then in 1978, the Ohio
Court of Appeals for Lucas County held in Delamotte v. Unitcast Division of Midland Ross Corp." that an employee's remedy under the
Workers' Compensation Act was not an exclusive remedy and that an
action could be brought when the employer had committed an intentional or malicious act resulting in injury to an employee. 18 The Delamotte court relied on the language of section 4123.74 which provides
in part: "Employers who comply with section 4123.35 shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law . . . for any injury . . .
received or contracted by any employee in the course of . . . his employment , . .. " The court stated that such language "clearly limits
the categories of injuries for which the employer is exempt from civil
liability."2 0 The Delamotte court ruled that an intentional tort was not
within the scope of employment and was thus beyond the immunity
granted by the statute.2 1
The Ohio Supreme Court, in the 1982 landmark case of Blankenship v. CincinnatiMilacron Chemicals Inc.,'2 cited the Delamotte deci-

sation system and that the constitution's statutory counterpart, General Code section 1465-70,
precluded an employee from maintaining an action at common law).
12. 135 Ohio St. 191, 20 N.E.2d 232 (1939).
13. Id. at 197, 20 N.E.2d at 235.
14. Id.
15. 1959 Ohio Laws 1334.
16. See generally 39 0. JuR. 3D Employment Relations § 196 (1982).
17. 64 Ohio App. 2d 159, 411 N.E.2d 814 (1978).
18. Id. at 164, 411 N.E.2d at 816. Plaintiff alleged that his employer withheld information
regarding a progressive lung condition discovered in the employer's physical examination of plaintiff. Id. at 160, 411 N.E.2d at 815.
19. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.74 (Anderson 1980) (amended 1986).
20. Delamotte, 64 Ohio App. 2d at 161, 411 N.E.2d at 816.
21. Id.
Ohio St. 2d 1986
608, 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982).
Published22.by 69
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sion with approval2 s and held that where an employee alleged that an
intentional tort committed by his employer had caused him injury, the
complaint was sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss that was
based on statutory immunity." Such conduct, according to the court,
25
was not within the scope of employment and did not fall within the
provision of former section 4123.74 providing employer immunity for
26
injuries "contracted in the course of or arising out of" employment.
The court reasoned that the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is to protect an employer from actions based in negligence in
27
exchange for the employer's compliance with the Act. The court
viewed the Act as a compromise: Employees give up their common-law
remedies and accept fewer benefits in exchange for "a greater assurance of recovery. '"28 Employers, on the other hand, "give up their com' 29
mon law defenses and are protected from unlimited liability." Affording immunity from intentional tort actions would not promote one of
the "avowed purposes of the Act [, namely] to promote a safe and injury-free work environment, ' '3 0 because an employer could commit an
intentional tort knowing that the harshest penalty that might befall
1
him would be a slight increase in his workers' compensation premium."
An employer might find it more economically efficient to ignore dangerous conditions and suffer a slight increase in premiums than to provide safety equipment or to correct such conditions. Further, the court
noted that the workers' compensation system is based on insurance
principles and that insurance policies do not protect their holders from
liability for intentional torts. 2
In dissent, Justice Krupansky argued that the onslaught of employee suits resulting from the majority decision would result in increased costs for manufacturers which would inevitably be passed on to
consumers.33 Thus, goods manufactured in Ohio would be less competitive in the open market and businesses would be discouraged from locating in and staying in Ohio.3 4 The result would be that, in the end,

23. Id. at 612-13, 433 N.E.2d at 576.
24. Id. at 615-16, 433 N.E.2d at 578.
25. Id. at 613, 433 N.E.2d at 576.
26. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.74 (Anderson 1980) (amended 1986).
27. Blankenship, 69 Ohio St. 2d at 614, 433 N.E.2d at 577.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 615, 433 N.E.2d at 577.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 624, 433 N.E.2d at 582 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
34. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/15
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labor as a whole would suffer because there would be fewer jobs. 35
The Blankenship decision, while expanding the scope of workers'
rights to sue at common law, left several issues unresolved. First, the
court did not define what acts were sufficient to constitute an intentional tort. Second, the court did not address whether an employee who
had received workers' compensation benefits could also initiate a civil
suit based in intentional tort. Finally, the court left unanswered the
question of whether an award won by an employee in a civil action
would be reduced by the amount of any workers' compensation benefits
received by the employee.
In 1984, these issues were clarified in Jones v. VIP Development
Co.3 6 The Jones court held that "an intentional tort is an act committed with the intent to injure another, or committed with the belief that
such injury is substantially certain to occur."137 The court then held
that proof of purposeful injury is not necessary in an action based in
intentional tort and that intent might be inferred from an actor's conduct and the surrounding circumstances.38 The court emphasized that
it is the "element of substantial certainty which distinguishes a merely
negligent act from intentionally tortious conduct."3 9 This decision apparently conflicted with an earlier supreme court case that had defined
an intentional tort as an act committed with the specific intent or purpose to cause injury40 and thus expanded opportunities for injured employees to seek remedies in civil actions outside the workers' compensa4
tion system. '
The Jones court also held that an employee was not barred from
bringing an action based in intentional tort although he had previously
received workers' compensation benefits.4 The court reasoned that to

35. Id.
36. 15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 472 N.E.2d 1046 (1984).
37. Id. at 95, 472 N.E.2d at 1051.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Payne v. Vance, 103 Ohio St. 59, 133 N.E. 85 (1921) (distinguishing negligence
from
an intentional tort by saying that the additional element of intent had to be present
for an intentional tort).
41. The three cases consolidated in Jones were: Jones v. VIP Development Co.,
Gains v.
City of Painesville, and Hamlin v. Snow Metal Prods. Jones. 15 Ohio St. 3d at 90,
472 N.E.2d at
1046. In Jones, the plaintiffs alleged that the employer had knowingly exposed plaintiff
to high
voltage lines and had failed to make the premises safe and to warn plaintiffs. Id.
at 95-96, 472
N.E.2d at 1051-52. In Gains, the plaintiff alleged that the decedent's employer
had "intentionally, maliciously, willfully and wantonly" removed a safety cover from a discharge
chute and that
the removal had lead to decedent's death. Id. at 96, 472 N.E.2d at 1052. In Hamlin,
the plaintiffs
alleged that the employer exposed plaintiffs to chemicals that the employer knew
were hazardous
to plaintiffs' health and that the employer continued to assure plaintiffs that their
working environment was safe. Id. at 97, 472 N.E.2d at 1053.
Id. at 100, 4721986
N.E.2d at 1054.
Published42.by eCommons,
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bar an employee from pursuing a common-law remedy simply because
he had received workers' compensation benefits would encourage inten4s
tionally tortious conduct by employers. Most employees would not be
able to afford to wait for the conclusion of lengthy litigation before
receiving some type of compensation.- If the employee was barred
from initiating a civil suit by the receipt of workers' compensation benefit, employers would be in a position to prolong litigation and thereby
force the injured employee to elect to receive benefits under the syspurposes, would still be immune
tem. 45 Employers, for all practical
46
law.
common
from actions at
The Jones court also addressed the issue of double recovery. The
court held that an employer is not entitled to a setoff of a judgment
entered against him in an amount equal to the workers' compensation
47
benefits received by the employee. As in Blankenship, the court cited
the insurance principles behind the workers' compensation system in
reasoning that, as with general insurance, a wrongdoer is not entitled to
in the amount of insurance benefits received by the injured
a setoff
4"
party.
The Jones decision, as noted by Justice Holmes in his dissent in
Bradfield v. Stop-N-Go Foods, Inc.," led to the anomalous situation in
which an employee who sued an employer that was in compliance with
the Workers' Compensation Act could recover both workers' compensa50
who
tion benefits and damages in a civil suit, whereas an employeelaw.
51
common
at
only
recover
sued a noncomplying employer could
This situation could occur because under sections 4123.75 2 and
4123.77 5 of the Ohio Revised Code, an employee who sued a noncomplying employer had to repay to the State Insurance Fund an amount
equal to the workers' compensation benefits he had received if he prevailed in his common-law action." Under Jones, an employee who sues

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 99, 472 N.E.2d at 1054.
Id.
Id.
id.
Id. at 100, 472 N.E.2d at 1055.
Id.
a
17 Ohio St. 3d 58, 477 N.E.2d 621 (1985) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In Bradfield,

51.

Id.

52.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

store clerk was stabbed by a robber while working in a convenience store. The plaintiff alleged
that decedent was stabbed because of the employer's "malicious failure to provide reasonable
measures for decedent's (safety] . . . in wanton disregard of their duty to protect . . . its employees." Id. at 58-59, 477 N.E.2d at 621.
50. Id. at 60, 477 N.E.2d at 622.
§ 4123.75 (Anderson 1980).

53. Id. § 4123.77.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/15
54. See Bradfield, 17 Ohio St. 3d at 60, 477 N.E. 2d at 622.
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a complying employer and prevails is under no obligation to reimburse
the State Insurance Fund for any benefits he may have received. 55 Consequently, employees who had identical injuries might receive widely
disparate compensation.5 Additionally, an employer who was in compliance with the law would, in effect, pay twice for the same injury,
once in the form of workers' compensation premiums and once in the
form of a civil judgment.5 A noncomplying employer, on the other
hand, would be required to pay only the civil judgment." Justice
Holmes felt that such a result would encourage noncompliance and
frustrate the intent of the Act.5 9
C. The Passage of S. 307
The liberalization of the right of employees to sue at common law
led to demands from the Ohio business community for a legislative
overruling of Blankenship and its progeny. 60 The supreme court decisions had, according to business, "created vast uncertainties for employers, stunting business planning and economic growth."'" Ohio developed, according to one editorial, a reputation as being antibusiness
and persuading businesses to locate or expand in Ohio was becoming
2
more and more difficult.
Whether the decisions were, in fact, having an impact on business
in Ohio is not clear. What is clear, is that a perception arose that there
was a workers' compensation "crisis" in Ohio. 3 Employers and their
business organizations mounted an extensive media campaign to pressure the legislature to act by creating a public perception that Ohio
was losing its competitive position and that the eventual result would
be mass unemployment in Ohio. 64
Several bills were introduced in the Ohio legislature to remedy the
situation during 1985.1 5 Previously, almost all workers' compensation
legislation was the result of labor management negotiations66 and a
subsequent approach to the legislature with the results of such negotia55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
col. I.
62.
2, 1986,

Id. (citing Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 472 N.E.2d 1046 (1984)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
J. HARRIS, supra note 3, at 35.
Workers' Compensation to Be Re-examined, The Journal Herald, Jan. 15, 1986, at 17,

Workers' Compensation Bill Inspires Barrage of Hyperbole, The Journal Herald, June
at 12 col. I.
63. J. HARRIS. supra note 3, at 3.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 3-4.
at 1-2.
Published66.by Id.
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tions.6 7 That was not to be the case with S. 307.18 Despite efforts by
Governor Celeste to bring the two groups together, representatives of
labor and management interests were unable to reach agreement on the
contents of the new legislation." The Ohio Senate passed S. 307 on
February 6, 1986,70 and the Ohio House passed its own workers compensation reform bill, H. 73, on February 7, 1986.71 Neither bill passed
in the other chambers and a conference committee was appointed to
work out the differences.7 2
S. 307 was sent to and approved by the full House on May 13,
74
1986, 7 and by the Senate on May 15, 1986. The hearings, votes, and
75
approvals of the bill were conducted under extreme pressure. Union
officials threatened to withdraw financial support from democratic leg1
islators and Governor Celeste if the bill was approved.
It was amid this climate of crisis, with threats of mass business
defection and political retribution, that Ohio lawmakers passed the
sweeping reforms of Ohio's workers' compensation system contained in
S. 307. It may be that the pressure to resolve the crisis led the legislators to pass the bill without giving adequate consideration to the impact
that its provisions would have. Whatever the reason for its haste, the
Ohio Legislature has passed a bill that will result in controversy for
some time to come.
III.
A.

PROVISIONS OF S.

307

Elimination of the Right to Trial by Jury

77
Unlike the former statute section 4121.80 of the Ohio Revised
Code expressly permits an employee to bring an intentional tort action

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 3.
70. Id.
71. id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 4.
74. Before the Bill was sent to the House and Senate for approval, eleven drafts were written, see id. at Forward by Senator Finan, and five revisions were made. Id. at 4.
75. See id. at Foreward by Representative Skeen. During one of the hearings, a United
Auto Workers representative dangled a noose in front of legislators after their vote. See Workers'
Compensation Bill Fair to Workers, Employers, The Journal Herald, Mar. 30, 1986, at 8 col. 1.
76. Hallet, Ohio Workers' Protection Bill Signed into Law, The Toledo Blade, May 24,
1986, at 1, col. 5. Milan Marsh, president of the Ohio AFL-CIO, called the bill's approval "an
extremely serious breach of faith with the working citizens of this state," id., and accused the
governor and the legislature of bowing to pressure from irresponsible businessmen. White, Workers' Comp Bill Is Signed, Cincinnati Enquirer, May 24, 1986, at 1, col. 5.
77. A cause of action for intentional tort was recognized only judicially in Blankenship. See
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/15
supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
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in common pleas court.7 8 However, section 4121.80(D) provides that in
such an action the court determines only whether an intentional tort
has been committed and whether the employer is liable for that tort.79
The Ohio Industrial Commission then determines the amount of damages.8 0 Although the language of 4121.80(D) does not so provide expressly, the provision is unmistakeably intended to eliminate jury consideration even on the issue of liability. 8 1 Since a judge acting without
a jury determines liability and the Ohio Industrial Commission determines damages, the plaintiff employee is precluded from a trial by jury
on both the issues of fact and damages.
B.

New Definition of Intentional Tort

Section 4121.80(G)(1) of the Ohio Revised Code defines an intentional tort as "an act committed with the intent to injure another or
committed with the belief that the injury is substantially certain to occur." 82 This definition is virtually identical to the one expounded by the
Ohio Supreme Court in Jones v. VIP Development Co..8s However,
whereas the Jones court held that specific intent might be inferred
from an actor's conduct and the surrounding circumstances," section
4121.80(G)(1) provides that an employer must have acted with "deliberate intent to cause an employee to suffer injury, disease, condition, or
death." 85 This provision obviously heightens the burden of proof placed
upon an employee who alleges that his injury resulted from the intentional tort of his employer.
C. Limitation on Damages
Section 4121.80(D) of the Ohio Revised Code limits the amount
78. "Ifinjury . . .results to any employee from the intentional tort of his employer, the
employee . . . [has] a cause of action against the employer .
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4121.80(A) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
79. Id. § 4121.80(D) ("[T]he court is limited to a determination as to whether or not the
employer is liable for damages on the basis that the employer committed an intentional tort.").
80. Id.
81. 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-374, 5-376 (Baldwin); Telephone interview with Amy
Showalter-Newman, legislative aid to Senator Finan, sponsor of S. 307 (Mar. 2, 1987); see also J.
HARRIS, supra note 3, at 38. In the only case which has at this writing survived a motion to
dismiss or summary judgment and proceeded to trial under § 4121.80, of the Ohio Revised Code,
liability was determined by a jury. Pratt v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., No. C-I-83-249
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 1986). However, this case was heard by a federal court whose applications of
Ohio statutes are not binding on Ohio courts.
82. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(G)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
83. 15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 95, 472 N.E.2d 1046, 1051 (1984) ("[An act committed with the
intent to injure another, or committed with the belief that such injury is substantially certain to
occur.").
84. id.
OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 4121.80(G)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
Published85.by eCommons,
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that an employee may recover in an action based in intentional tort to
the "benefits payable under chapter 4123 of the Revised Code and the
net financial loss to the employee caused by the employer's intentional
tort . . . but in no event may an award under this section exceed one
million dollars." 86 Consequently, an employee may receive an award
from the Ohio Industrial Commission that is substantially less than he
in a traditional common-law action for injury to his
might receive
87
person.
D.

Retroactive Application of Section 4121.80

Section 4121.80(H) provides that section 4121.80 of the Ohio Revised Code applies to any action based in intentional tort that is "pend88
ing in any court on the effective date of this section." Therefore, employees who have filed intentional tort actions but whose cases have not
yet been finally adjudicated lose their right to trial by jury, are subject
to the new definition of intentional tort, and are limited to a maximum
89
damage award of one million dollars. Since section 4121.80(H) applies to any action based in intentional tort pending in "any" court, it
would appear that those cases pending in courts of appeals are also
subject to the provisions of section 4121.80.

IV.

ANALYSIS

A. Constitutionality of the Retroactive and Prospective Elimination
of the Right to Trial by Jury
It is settled law that a workers' compensation act will not be
deemed violative of the United States Constitution because it denies a
trial by jury to an employee who comes within the scope of its provisions.90 Therefore, if section 4121.80(D) is to be held unconstitutional
it will be because it violates some right guaranteed by the Ohio Constitution. Article II, section 35 of the Ohio Constitution provides that a
board may be established by the legislature to administer the workmen's compensation fund and that the board may be empowered to
91
determine "all rights of claimants" to benefits under the fund. Article
I, section 5, of the Ohio Constitution which guarantees a right to trial

86. Id. § 4121.80(D).
87. The statute makes no provision for compensatory damages for pain and suffering, medical expenses in excess of $1,000,000, or for punitive damages.
88. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(H) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
89. Id. § 4121.
90. See Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 236 (1917); see also Hawkins
v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 216 (1917).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/15
91. OHIo CONST. art. I1, § 35.
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by jury does not extend the right to all cases.91 Article I, section 5,
provides only that the right to trial by jury shall be "inviolate." 9 3-that
is, the right to trial by jury cannot be eliminated for those actions
where, (1) it existed at common law or, (2) it was granted by statute at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution in 1802.94 If section
4121.80(D) is to be held constitutionally invalid, it will have to be either on the basis that it eliminates the right to trial by jury in an action
where it existed at common law or that it was a right granted by a
statute which was in effect prior to the adoption of the Ohio Constitution of 1802.
The continuing right to trial by jury in actions where the right
existed at common law was granted statutorily by article II of the Ordinance of 1787. 95 The Ohio Constitution of 1802 provided in Schedule
Section 1 that "all rights, suits, actions . . .shall continue, as if no
change had taken place in this government." ' The right to trial by
jury in actions based in intentional tort was recognized at common law
prior to the adoption of the Ordinance of 1797 and the adoption of the
Ohio Constitution in 1802. Therefore, the right to trial by jury in actions based in intentional tort was provided for statutorily prior to the
adoption of the Constitution of 1802 and was preserved by the enactment of that constitution.
Furthermore, a statutory guarantee of trial by jury in such actions
has existed in some form since Ohio became a state. Currently, section
2311.04 of the Revised Code provides that there is a right to trial by
jury in actions involving "issues of fact arising in actions for the recovery of money only. ' '97 Whether an action is one for money only depends
on the nature of the decree that a court will be required to enter upon
its journal.9 8 Normally, only pecuniary damages are awarded in actions

92. Id. at art. I, § 5.
93. Id. ("The right of trial by jury shall be inviolate, except that, in civil cases, laws may be
passed to authorize the rendering of a verdict by the concurrence of not less that three-fourths of
the jury.").
94. See Mason v. State, 58 Ohio St. 30, 55, 50 N.E. 6, 9 (1898) (no right to trial by jury
where court could not find such a right to exist at common law or by statute); see generally 64 0.
JUR. 3D Jury § 24 (1985). While the legislature may not eliminate the right to trial by jury, it
may expand that right by statute. Gunsaullus v. Pettit, 46 Ohio St. 27, 28, 17 N.E. 231, 231
(1888).
95. U.S.C. vol. I, at XLV, XLVI (1982), reprinted in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. app. at 343,
345 (Anderson 1979).
96. OHIO CONST. sched. § 1 (1802) (repealed 1851).
97. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2311.04 (Anderson 1980).
98. Lange v. Lange, 69 Ohio St. 346, 350, 69 N.E. 611, 612 (1904) (The court held that it
is "not the principles which the court is required to consider and apply in determining the rights of
the partieb, but what decree it is required to enter upon its journal" that determines whether a
party by
has eCommons,
a right to a jury
trial.).
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for personal injuries.9 9 Therefore, an action based in intentional tort
would normally fall within the statutory provision guaranteeing trial by
jury. Additionally, an action to recover damages for injury to person or
property has always been recognized as entailing the right to a jury
100 Since the right to trial by jury was
trial under Ohio common law.
provided in actions in intentional tort prior to the enactment of the
1802 constitution and is guaranteed by the present statute, the elimination of that right by section 4121.80(D) violates article 1, section 5 of
the Ohio Constitution and should be found to be unconstitutional in
both its retroactive and prospective application.
It can be argued that the legislature may prospectively eliminate
10 1 In fact, it is because common-law
common-law causes of action.
causes of action were eliminated by statute for injuries incurred in the
course of employment that workers compensation acts have been up10 2
However, the Ohio
held as not violating the right to trial by jury.
General Assembly did not eliminate the common-law cause of action
based in intentional tort by enacting S. 307. A close reading of sections
4121.80(A) and 4121.80(B) leads to the inescapable conclusion that
03 As the Ohio Supreme
the common-law cause of action is retained.
04
Court held in Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, 0Inc.,
an intentional tort is not within the scope of one's employment.1 5 Further, the court held that in recognizing the plaintiff's claim it was not
creating a new cause of action but merely affirming the right to an
existing one.10 6 Section 4121.80(D) should not be found constitutional
as having eliminated the cause of action altogether.
The retroactive application of section 4121.80(D) presents additional constitutional difficulties. Article II, section 28 of the Ohio Con-

99. See generally 30 0. JUR. 3D Damages § 43 (1981).
100. State ex rel. Turner v. Fassig, 18 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 177, 185 (1915), rev'd on other
grounds, 95 Ohio St. 233, 116 N.E. 104 (1917).
101. See State ex rel. Yaple v. Creamer, 85 Ohio St. 349, 397, 97 N.E. 602, 606 (1912);
see generally 16 0. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 306 (1979).
see
102. See Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Huhn, 165 Ga. 667, 142 S.E. 121 (1928);
(1976).
20
§
generally 81 AM. JUR. 2D Workmens' Compensation
103. Section 4121.80(A) provides that "if injury . . . results to [an] employee from the
intentional tort of his employer . . . [the employee has] a cause of action against the employer
says
.O.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(A) (Anderson Supp. 1986). Section 4121.80(B)
.
disputes
all
system
tort
law
common
the
from
"remove
that the purpose of section 4121.80 is to
for injury
between or among employers and employees regarding the compensation to be received
that
exception
The
added).
(emphasis
4121.80(B)
§
Id.
. . . except as herein expressly provided."
Id. §
section 4121.80(B) refers to is the cause of action granted by section 4121.80(A).
of action
4121.80(A). Consequently, the legislature has expressly retained a common-law cause
from which it cannot eliminate the right to trial by jury.
104. 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982).
105. Id. at 613, 433 N.E.2d at 576.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/15
106. Id. at 612-13, 433 N.E.2d at 576.
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stitution prohibits the enactment of retroactive laws that impair vested
substantive rights."'7 In 1864, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted Justice
Story's classic statement, "Upon principle, every statute which takes
away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a
new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in
respect to transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed
retrospective," 0 8 as the definition of retroactive as used in article II,
section 28 of the Ohio Constitution. 10 Later in Weil v. Taxicabs of
Cincinnati, Inc.," 0 the Ohio Supreme Court applied Justice Story's
definition and held that a statutory act which took away an accrued
(Vested) common-law right of action affected substantive rights and
could not be retroactively applied even though it substituted a right to
compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act."' Section
4121.80(D) applied retroactively impairs the employee's right to bring
an action, as well as the employer's right to defend actions as they
existed at common law." 2 Further, the right to trial by jury has been
held to be a substantive right, not merely a remedial one." 8 Since the
right to trial by jury is a substantive right and since section 4121.80(D)
and section 4121.80(H) combine to retroactively eliminate that right,
the only remaining question is whether the statute eliminates an accrued (vested) right.
Generally, a cause of action accrues at the instant a wrong is committed and injury results. In Industrial Commission V. Kamrath,"4
the court held that plaintiff's cause of action accrued under the Workers' Compensation Act at the instant of her husband's death., Consequently, employees who have suffered injuries and filed causes of action
prior to the effective date of S. 307 have accrued (vested) common-law
causes of action-substantive rights which cannot be impaired retroactively without violating article II, section 28 of the Ohio Constitution.

107. OHIo CONST. art. Ii, § 28.
108. Society for Propagation of Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814)
(No. 13,156).
109.

Rairden v. Holden, 15 Ohio St. 207, 210-11 (1864).

110.

139 Ohio St. 198, 39 N.E.2d 148 (1942).

Id. at 204-05, 39 N.E.2d at 151.
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(D) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
113. Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Halliday, 127 Ohio St. 278, 284, 188 N.E. I, 3 (1933) (holding
invalid a rule of court providing for a civil jury trial with six instead of the normal twelve jurors as
impinging upon the constitutional right to trial by jury).
Ill.

112.

114.

118 Ohio St. I, 160 N.E. 470 (1928).
115. Id. at 7, 160 N.E. at 472 (injured employee's cause of action accrued at the time of his
injury by
andeCommons,
his wife's cause
of action as his dependant survivor accrued at the time of his death).
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B. Constitutionality of the Retroactive and Prosepective Application
of the New Definition of Intentional Tort
Section 4121.80(G)(1) of the Ohio Revised Code adopts the definition of intentional tort expounded by the Ohio Supreme Court in
Jones v. VIP Development Co.: i "an act committed with the intent to
injure another, or committed with the belief that such injury is substantially certain to occur." ' However, whereas the Jones court held
that intent could be inferred from conduct and circumstances where
8
evidence of purposeful injury was lacking," section 4121.80(G)(1) defines "substantially certain" to require "deliberate intent to cause an
employee to suffer injury, disease, condition, or death."" The new definition presents the injured employee with a higher burden of proof
under section 4121.80(G)(1) than under the definition presented by the
Ohio Supreme Court in Jones.
1. Constitutionality of the Retroactive Application
The validity of the retroactive application of this new definition
depends on whether it impairs a vested substantive right or is merely
remedial in nature.
The Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Cincinnati Tin & Japan
20 held that a statute which retroactively heightened the evidenCo,'
tiary burden imposed upon a party who had a vested right to property
was void as infringing upon article II, section 28, and article I, section
Additionally, Ohio courts have held
19, of the Ohio Constitution.'
that a vested right of action in tort is a property right and is constitu22
tionally protected from arbitrary interference.1 Thus, employees who
had vested causes of action pending in court on the effective date of S.
307 had vested property rights. The retroactive imposition of the new
definition of intentional tort increases the evidentiary burden on those
123
Certainly, that burden
employees attempting to enforce that right.
impairs the vested right in that cause of action and may destroy it.
Where employees are unable to prove the specific intent required under
section 4121.80(G)(1), they will be denied a property right without due
process of law as required by article I, section 19, of the Ohio Constitu-

116. 15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 472 N.E.2d 1046 (1984).
117. Id. at 95, 472 N.E.2d at 1051.
118. Id.
119. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(G)(I) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
120. 66 Ohio St. 182, 64 N.E. 68 (1902).
121. Id. at 200-02, 64 N.E. at 71.
122. See Pickering v. Peskind, 43 Ohio App. 401, 408-09, 183 N.E. 301, 303 (1930); see
also Cincinnati v. Hafer, 49 Ohio St. 60, 30 N.E. 197 (1892).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/15
123. See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(G)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
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tion and the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.
2.

Constitutionality of the Prospective Application

The prospective application of the new definition raises different
constitutional concerns. The Ohio Supreme Court held in Fassig v.
State ex rel. Turner"" that "no one has a vested right in the rules of
common law.' 25 The court held that while vested common-law rights
may not be eliminated without due process of law, the purpose of the
legislative power is "to remedy defects in the common law as they are
developed and to adapt it to new circumstances."' 2 6 Those employees
whose causes of action accrued after the effective date of S. 307 have
no vested right in the old definition. Further, there is no constitutional
prohibition against prospectively increasing the burden of proof in a
common-law cause of action.' 2 7 However, since the common-law cause
of action in intentional tort retained, there arises a question of the
equal protections guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution. Injured employees bear a higher burden of
proof than do plaintiffs in other classifications. 2 8 Plaintiffs in a classification other than that of employee need prove only the intent level established by decisional law-wherein intent may be inferred by indirect
evidence' 29 -in actions based in intentional tort. Employees, on the
other hand, are subject to the heightened burden of proof requiring
evidence of deliberate intent established by section 4121.80(G)(1)-)10
Workmen's compensation acts have generally been upheld as a
valid exercise of the police power.' 3 ' Special or discriminatory treat-

124. 95 Ohio St. 232, 116 N.E. 104 (1917).
125. Id. at 248, 116 N.E. at 108.
126. Id.
127. See Hammond v. State, 78 Ohio St. 15, 84 N.E. 416 (1908) (legislature may determine what evidence is sufficient to state a cause of action provided it does not offend constitutional
guarantees).
128. Under an equal protection analysis, the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution require that all of those falling within the same class be treated the same and
that classifications not be unreasonable or arbitrary. See State ex rel. Lampson v. Cook, 44 Ohio
App. 501, 514, 185 N.E. 212, 217 (1932). There need only be a reasonable grounds for the classification In drawing the classifications, the legislature has wide discretion. See Porter v. Oberlin, I
Ohio St. 2d 143, 151-52, 205 N.E.2d 363, 369 (1965).
129. The provisions of section 4121.80(G)(1) refer only to actions instituted by an employee
against an employer. OHIO REV. CODE.ANN. § 4121.80(G)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1986). Obviously,
an individual who initiates an intentional tort action against someone other than his employer
would not fall within the Act and would not be subject to its definition for intentional tort. Such a
person would need only prove an intentional tort as defined in Jones. 15 Ohio St. 3d at 95, 472
N.E.2d at 1051.
130. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(G)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
131. State ex rel Yaple v. Creamer, 85 Ohio St. 349, 352, 97 N.E. 602, 604 (1912); see
also 81 AM. JUR. 2D Workmens' Compensation § 71 (1976).
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ment based on employee status has been held not to violate article II,
section 26 of the Ohio Constitution or the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution.1 32
The classification of employees under workers' compensation acts
" It is generally held that absent
has been held not to be arbitrary.
arbitrary classification, discrimination by the legislature based on that
classification need only represent a reasonable means of attaining a
valid state objective. 34 In order for an exercise of the police power to
be reasonable, it need only equally affect all those subjects of legislation which stand in the same situation with respect to the evil remedied. " 5 Only when a classification has no reasonable basis will a law be
36
overturned as violative of equal protection.
Therefore, since workers' compensation acts are a valid exercise of
the police power and since it can reasonably be concluded that the
heightened burden of proof, which restricts tort claims that can be
heard outside the workers' compensation system, is consistent with the
"intent of the legislature to effect prompt resolution" of workers' compensation claims,13 7 the prospective application of section
4121.80(G)(1) is likely to be upheld as a reasonable means of obtaining a valid state objective.
C. Constitutionalityof the Retroactive and Prospective Limitation on
Damages
1. Contitutionality of the Retroactive Application
Section 4121.80(D) of the Ohio Revised Code limits the amount
of damages that an employee may receive in an action based in intentional tort to one million dollars. "' This section is given retroactive ap3 9 Section 4121.80(D) makes no explication by section 4121.80(H).'
ceptions for cases in which economic damages exceed one million
dollars and does not appear to provide for consideration of other
damages normally recoverable in actions based in intennoneconomic
4 0°
tional tort.

132. Creamer, 85 Ohio St. at 405, 97 N.E. at 608.
133. See Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 243-44 (1917).
134. Id. That is unless the classification is based on sex, race, wealth, or union membership,
in which case the courts will scrutinize the justification for the classification much more closely.
See generally 17 0. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law §§ 632-637 (1980).
135. See Dillon v. Cleveland, 117 Ohio St. 258, 272, 158 N.E. 606, 611 (1927).
136. Id.
137. Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(B) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
138. Id. § 4121.80(D).
139. Id. § 4121.80(H).
140. Id. § 4121.80(D) (providing that in making a damage award, the Ohio Industrial
Commission shall consider the benefits payable under section 4123, which deals with workers
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/15
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There is a paucity of case law available on the constitutionality of
statutes placing a fixed sum cap on damages awardable in personal injury actions. Several states, however, have passed damage cap statutes
" ' Ohio's
with regard to medical malpractice actions. 14
medical malpractice statute, section 2307.43 of the Ohio Revised Code, places a
$250,000 limit on general damages in medical malpractice actions not
involving death. 142 The case law surrounding such statutes provides at
least a framework for analyzing the limitation imposed by section
4121.80(D).
In Young v. Alberts,"Is the court held that if the limitation on
malpractice damages were to have been applied retroactively, it would
have been constitutionally prohibited by article II, section 28 of the
Ohio Constitution.14 4 The court found that the retrospective application
of the limitation impaired a substantive right.' 4 5 Applying the rationale
of Young to the retroactive application of the workers' compensation
damage limitation imposed by section 4121.80(D) leads to the inescapable conclusion that a substantive right would be impaired thereby
and that retroactive application of the limitation is therefore
unconstitutional.
The retroactive application of the damage cap may also be said to
constitute a deprivation of property without due process."16 Not only is
the right of action considered a property right, but so too may be the
damages. 4 17 In Cincinnati v. Hafer,"18 the court implied that damages
due in tort actions were property.' 9 However, it is difficult to discern
whether the court is referring to damages in a judgment received or in
a judgment not yet rendered. Further, the court appears to merge the
concepts of damages and of the cause of action as a single property

compensation benefits, and the "net financial loss to the employee," but in no case shall the award
exceed one million dollars). Section 4121.80(D) appears to make no provision for consideration of
mental anguish or suffering which is normally recoverable in an action to recover for personal
injury in which the conduct of the tortfeasor was wanton, willful, or malicious. See Cincinnati N.
Traction Co. v. Rosnagle, 84 Ohio St. 310, 318-19, 95 N.E. 884, 886 (1911). Section 4121.80(D)
also does not appear to provide for an award of punitive damages which are normally recoverable
in an action in which the plaintiff's injury was caused by the willful or reckless conduct of the
tortfeasor. See Petrey v. Liuzzi, 76 Ohio App. 19, 27, 61 N.E.2d 158, 162 (1945).
141. See generally Duren v. Surburban Community Hosp., 24 Ohio Misc. 2d 25, 482
N.E.2d 1358 (C.P. Ct. 1985) (analysis of California, Idaho, New Hampshire, and Texas statutes
which limit damages in medical malpractice actions).
142. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Anderson 1981).
143. 73 Ohio Op. 2d 32, 342 N.E.2d 700 (C.P. Ct. 1975).
144. Id. at 34, 342 N.E.2d at 701-02.
145. Id. at 34, 342 N.E.2d at 702.
146. J. HARRIS, supra note 3, at 52.
147. Id.
148. 49 Ohio St. 60, 30 N.E. 197 (1892).
Id. at 66-68, 1986
30 N.E. at 198-99.
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right.15
If, as is suggested by these cases, the limitation on damages impairs a substantive right, either the vested right in the cause of action
or the vested right to damages, the retroactive limitation on damages
must be found unconstitutional. Case law fails to sustain any argument
that damages are a remedy and that as such do not constitute a substantive right. "1 Courts that have ruled on the retroactive application
of Ohio's medical malpractice statute have found that the limitation on
damages is an unconstitutional impairment of a vested substantive
right. 52 Unless a rationale is formulated to distinguish workers' compensation damages, it would appear that the limitation on damages imposed by section 4121.80(D) would likewise impair a vested substantive
right and would be violate the constitutional prohibition against retrospective laws.
2.

Constitutionality of the Prospective Application

Challenges to the prospective application of limitations of awards
in medical malpractice actions have been successful on equal protection
3
grounds. In Graley v. Satayatham," the court found that there was no
satisfactory reason for treating the medical profession differently than
other tortfeasors.'5 The court held that the classification was unreasonable and that to afford special protection to the medical profession simply because of its financial distress was violative of the equal protection
55
Similarly, in
clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions.
it a violation
held
court
the
Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center,'"
profession differently than any
of equal protection to treat the medical
57
actions.
other defendant in tort
The same argument would appear applicable to the special protection afforded to employers through the damage limitation imposed by
section 4121.80(D).5 This legislation again provides special treatment
to a particular segment of society that has claimed financial distress'"
while other groups in society are afforded no special relief for their

150. Id.
151. Cf Duren, 24 Ohio Misc. 2d at 25, 482 N.E.2d at 1358 (discussing medical malpractice damage limitation statutes that have been upheld in prospective application).
152. See Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (C.P.
Ct. 1976); see also Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (C.P. Ct. 1976).
153. 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E. 2d 832 (C.P. Ct. 1976)
154. Id. at 320, 343 N.E.2d at 837-38.
155. Id. at 319, 343 N.E.2d at 836.
156. 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (C.P. Ct. 1976).
157. Id. at 167, 355 N.E.2d at 906.
158. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(D) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/15
159. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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intentionally tortious conduct because of their financial status.
The classification of employees within workers' compensation acts,
unlike that of medical care providers or patients, has repeatedly been
upheld as valid. The intent of the legislation is to promote prompt resolution of disputes, to allow employers to plan around liability expenses,
and, most importantly, to promote safety in the workplace.1 60 While it
may be arguable how effective limiting damages will be in encouraging
employers to act responsibly, the objectives are nevertheless valid. The
means chosen by the legislature need not be the wisest nor even the
most effective means of achieving a valid state objective to be upheld
against equal protection claims. They need only be a reasonable mode
of obtaining that objective.
Since the classification of employees has been upheld as a reasonable means of effecting the objectives of workers' compensation systems,
the analogy with the medical malpractice statutes loses much force as
an argument against the prospective application of the damage cap imposed by section 4121.80(D), and it appears that this portion of the
statute is likely to be found constitutionally valid.
V.

CONCLUSION

In its zeal to remedy what it apparently believed to be a potentially disastrous situation, the Ohio Legislature has enacted a bill that
will generate litigation for years to come. Whether acting in haste or in
response to the pressure exerted by business interests, the result is an
act fraught with constitutionally suspect provisions.
Given the history of the workers' compensation system in Ohio,
however, it would be foolish to assume that S. 307 is the last chapter in
the workers' compensation saga. Further, the complexion of recent
Ohio Supreme Court decisions indicates that there may be substantial
alterations in the law through judicial review. Nor can the plaintiff's
bar be expected to accept the new law without a bitter fight.
It is unfortunate that a system with such admirable goals-the
prompt and fair resolution of the claims of injured employees-should
become the victim of a political football game. It seems a waste that
labor, management, and our elected officials should spend so much time
and effort haggling over a bill that is eventually going to have to be
rewritten by the courts when the avowed purpose of that bill was to
eliminate such bureaucratic headaches.
Gary A. Nasal
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